Ethiopia’s historical ties to the Red Sea underscore a long-standing claim to sovereign maritime access, a right that has been repeatedly challenged and obstructed through historical and legal injustices, particularly during the colonial and post-colonial eras. These efforts to render Ethiopia landlocked have had far-reaching consequences, impacting not only Ethiopia’s internal stability and development but also regional and international peace. Consequently, Ethiopia’s pursuit of its rightful sovereign access to the Red Sea remains a critical imperative, rooted in historical, legal, economic, and geopolitical considerations.
Historical Sovereignty and the Red Sea Connection
Historically, northern Ethiopia, known locally as “Medri Bahri” or the “land of the sea,” encompassed territories bordering the Red Sea that were under Ethiopian dominion for extended periods. A pivotal element of this historical connection was Adulis, a strategically vital port that exerted significant influence during the Axumite era. Adulis served as a crucial commercial nexus, linking Ethiopia and the wider African continent to global trade routes. Its importance to Axum’s economic prosperity and security cannot be overstated. Adulis was renowned as the primary port of the Kingdom of Aksum, one of the prominent ancient powers of the Horn of Africa.
Ethiopian rulers consistently maintained their historical authority over coastal regions and their hinterlands, including much of present-day Eritrea. During various epochs, Muslim sultanates situated along the coast operated as subordinate entities. Adulis, for instance, paid tribute to Axum, primarily in the form of customs duties and trade commodities such as ivory, gold, slaves, and spices. Axum exercised control over foreign trade and diplomatic relations through Adulis, holding ultimate authority over taxation, trade policies, and external affairs. This Ethiopian control persisted even in later periods, such as the Zemene Mesafint (Era of the Princes). In the 18th century, Ras Mikael Sehul of Tigray wielded effective power over Red Sea coastal areas, including Massawa, through various vassal principalities.
Modern Assertions of Sovereignty and Legal Claims
The 19th century witnessed significant military confrontations that affirmed Ethiopia’s sovereignty. Egyptian attempts to invade Ethiopia were decisively repelled by Ethiopian forces at the Battles of Gundet and Gura. These victories solidified Ethiopia’s dominion over both the Red Sea coastal territories and their inland extensions. These engagements underscored Ethiopia’s effective control over territories that now constitute Eritrea, historically referred to as Mereb Melash, a region integral to the Ethiopian Empire.
The Battle of Gundet took place in a narrow mountain pass near the village of Gundet in the Seraye district, a critical route connecting the port of Massawa to Adwa in Tigray. The subsequent and more decisive engagement, the Battle of Gura, occurred on the Plain of Gura, approximately 80 miles inland from Massawa. Gura, situated in the Akele Guzay region (today’s Debub Region of Eritrea), is located about 9 kilometers southeast of Dekemhare and roughly 32 kilometers south-southeast of Asmara. These combined victories unequivocally demonstrated that the hinterlands of present-day Eritrea were firmly under Ethiopian authority at that time.
A further clear affirmation of Ethiopia’s sovereign control over the Red Sea region is documented in the Hewett Treaty, also known as the Adwa or Adulis Treaty, signed in 1884. This foundational legal document significantly strengthened Ethiopia’s historical claim to Red Sea access. Negotiated in Adwa, the treaty involved the Ethiopian Empire, under Emperor Yohannes IV, and Great Britain, represented by Rear Admiral Sir William Hewett. Britain acted in part on behalf of Egypt, whose regional influence had diminished due to military setbacks and internal unrest. The treaty’s primary objectives were to cease prolonged Egyptian hostilities against Ethiopia and to secure Ethiopian cooperation in facilitating the evacuation of Egyptian forces trapped in Sudan during the Mahdist uprising.
Key provisions of the Hewett Treaty included the restoration of the Bogos district (in present-day Eritrea) to Ethiopian sovereignty. Territories such as Mereb, Bellesa, and Hamasien, which had been occupied by Egypt, were formally returned to Ethiopia. Crucially, the treaty also guaranteed Ethiopia’s authority over the ports of Massawa and Amphilla, along with the southern hinterlands of Massawa. In return, Ethiopia pledged to ensure the safe withdrawal of Egyptian garrisons from the Sudanese frontier.
Through these stipulations, the Hewett Treaty legally validated Ethiopia’s sovereignty over the Red Sea coastline and the hinterlands of what is now Eritrea, fully endorsing Ethiopia’s historical entitlement to Red Sea access prior to Italian colonial intervention. The treaty served as documentary evidence that regional and international actors of the period acknowledged Ethiopia’s legitimate access to the coast before Italy’s arrival.
However, despite Emperor Yohannes IV’s fulfillment of his treaty obligations, including the rescue of thousands of Egyptian soldiers, the agreement is often remembered in Ethiopian history as a betrayal. Less than a year later, in 1885, British authorities permitted Italy to occupy the port of Massawa, thereby undermining Ethiopia’s coastal access. This decision effectively severed Ethiopia from the Red Sea and paved the way for protracted conflict with Italian colonial forces, leading to significant battles such as the Battle of Dogali and ultimately the Battle of Adwa.
Italy’s Invasion and the Genesis of Eritrea
The Battle of Dogali, fought on January 26, 1887, near the town of Dogali within present-day Eritrea, marked a critical early confrontation preceding Italy’s full-scale invasion of Ethiopia’s coastal and subsequent inland territories. This battle represented a significant military clash between the Ethiopian Empire and the Kingdom of Italy. Following the Hewett Treaty, Italy occupied Massawa and began advancing inland into territories claimed by Ethiopia. Ras Alula Engida, the governor of the Mereb Melash region under Emperor Yohannes IV, demanded the withdrawal of Italian forces. When his demands were rejected, Ras Alula led an ambush against an Italian column commanded by Colonel Tommaso De Cristoforis. After an intense engagement, the Italian column was nearly annihilated. The Ethiopian victory at Dogali served as a potent symbolic assertion of Ethiopian sovereignty over the region.
In Italy, the defeat at Dogali, widely termed the “Dogali Massacre,” precipitated a profound political crisis, culminating in the resignation of Prime Minister Agostino Depretis. The event left an indelible mark on Italian national consciousness, commemorated by a monument honoring the “Five Hundred Heroes” in Rome’s Piazza dei Cinquecento.
Italian territorial expansion in the region commenced earlier with the acquisition of Assab, initiating a gradual process of colonial encroachment that ultimately led to the formal establishment of an Italian colony in 1890. Through this expansion, Italy invaded Ethiopia’s internationally recognized coastal territories and consolidated its control by creating the colony of Eritrea. The designation “Eritrea” was officially assigned on January 1, 1890, by the Italian colonial administration. Consequently, Eritrea was carved out of territory that had historically been an integral part of the Ethiopian state. Prior to Italian occupation, Eritrea did not exist as a distinct political or territorial entity; instead, it constituted an extension of Ethiopia’s historical domain.
Breached Boundary Treaties and Post-War Realities
The second Italian invasion of Ethiopia represented a clear violation of Italy’s own treaty obligations as stipulated in the boundary agreements of 1900, 1902, and 1908. By launching this invasion, Italy contravened the fundamental international legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, which mandates that states must adhere to their treaty commitments. This aggression further breached the Covenant of the League of Nations and the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact, both of which explicitly renounced war as an instrument of national policy. Additionally, Italy violated the Ethio-Italian Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration signed on August 2, 1928.
Following the Second World War, Ethiopia was reinstated to its pre-invasion territorial status. The 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy formally extinguished all Italian claims to sovereignty. As a result, the colonial boundary treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1908, which delineated the Ethiopia–Eritrea border, lost their legal force. This followed the doctrine of ipso facto termination, whereby the outbreak of war automatically abrogates preexisting treaties between belligerent states. Against this legal backdrop, Emperor Haile Selassie’s decision to reincorporate Eritrea into Ethiopia was both logical and consistent with the prevailing international legal norms of the time. This decision should therefore be assessed within its historical and legal context, rather than through the prism of standards that emerged decades later.
The United Nations-brokered federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, while politically expedient, represented a fundamentally flawed compromise. It failed to fully rectify the colonial dismemberment of Ethiopian territory and instead laid the foundation for future conflict. By not recognizing Eritrea as an integral part of Ethiopia prior to 1890, the arrangement left unresolved the core legal and historical injustice at the heart of the dispute.
In light of these factors, Ethiopia, as the parent state, maintains a compelling claim to reasonable access to the Red Sea. With the exception of a relatively brief period of Italian occupation, Ethiopia historically enjoyed access to the Red Sea, and principles of historical justice necessitate the correction of the profound injustices inflicted during the colonial, post-colonial, and more recent periods. Beyond historical considerations, Ethiopia’s access is also dictated by critical economic and security imperatives. Naval militarization, the establishment of foreign military bases, and the threat of piracy along this vital international waterway directly impact Ethiopia’s national interests.
Regrettably, there has been scant evidence of a genuine willingness from President Isaias Afwerki’s government to engage in constructive cooperation with Ethiopia. Instead, policies of destabilization have prevailed, driven by the perception that a strong and economically viable Ethiopia poses a strategic threat. Yet, Eritrea bears moral and legal responsibilities under the international principle of good neighborliness to consider Ethiopia’s vital interests. This obligation is amplified by the historical reality that Eritrean territory was fashioned from lands that had long been part of the Ethiopian state. Accordingly, Eritrea has both a moral and legal duty to accommodate Ethiopia’s need for sovereign access to the Red Sea. Without addressing this fundamental issue, lasting peace and genuine cooperation between the two countries will remain elusive.
Ethiopia’s landlocked status is neither a predetermined destiny nor an immutable fact. Geography need not dictate destiny; it can be reshaped by time and various factors. If left unaddressed, it becomes a source of regional instability and a significant impediment to sustainable development. For Ethiopia, the restoration of sovereign access to the Red Sea is not a matter of choice but a national imperative essential for long-term peace and prosperity. The path forward therefore requires the principled and resolute rectification of these long-standing injustices.
